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Abstract: This paper first describes three different views of instrumentalism, 
discusses the appropriateness of each in the context of adult education, then 
concludes with the author's position that instrumental approaches are sometimes 
appropriate and should not be dismissed out of hand. 
 
As so often happens, the issue of instrumentalism is confounded by the fact that different 
authors from different traditions use the term in different ways, leading to a degenerating “yes it 
is ... no it isn't” argument.  In this paper, I wish to describe three different views of the concept of 
instrumentalism: the view of Lukács and Habermas, the view ascribed to Dewey, and one 
version from the philosophy of science.  After the review of these various concepts of 
instrumentalism, I review the work of various authors who lay out some of the issues of 
instrumentalism as it applies to education and end with my own convictions on this subject. 
 
Review of the literature 
Habermas sees instrumentalism as the result of the “reification of consciousness”; 
reification refers to "the structural process whereby the commodity form permeates life in 
capitalist society ... (critical theorists are) especially concerned with how reification makes 
human beings 'seem like mere things obeying the inexorable laws of the marketplace'” 
(Zuidervaart, 2003).  According to Lukács, reification, “the assumption of man as he exists and 
an empirical world whose structure is unalterable” (Lukács, 1967) is a fundamental problem.  
This leads to an implicit, uncritical support of bourgeois society. “Reification is, then, the 
necessary, immediate reality of every person living in capitalist society. It can be overcome only 
by constant and constantly renewed efforts to disrupt the reified structure of existence by 
concretely relating to the concretely manifested contradictions of the total development, by 
becoming conscious of the immanent meanings of these contradictions for the total development” 
(Lukács, 1967, italics in original).  According to Habermas, this leads to a dehumanization of the 
proletariat. “The critique of instrumental reason aims at being critique in the sense that the 
reconstruction of instrumental reason's incessant operation reminds us of what has been 
sacrificed, of the mimetic impulses of a suppressed nature – of external nature, but, above all, of 
subjective nature” (Habermas, 1984, p. 383).   
  The second notion of instrumentalism that I wish to discuss is the way that Dewey used 
the term, i.e.: “the belief that makes knowledge merely a means to a practical end, or the 
satisfaction of practical needs” (Prawat, 2002, 868).  Although there is some controversy over 
whether this is always what Dewey meant when he used the term, this is the meaning which I 
want to analyze here.   In this sense, instrumentalism states that knowledge is useful, especially 
as a means of adjusting to an environmental situation; in this sense Dewey may have been 
influenced by Darwin. This is a sense of instrumentalism which is fundamentally pragmatic and 
individualistic – individuals use knowledge for their own purposes.  We will return to this 
position in the discussion of Blacker (below). 
The third view of instrumentalism comes from the philosophy of science.  According to 
Mattessich (1978),  “pure science” is interested in truths but not necessarily usefulness; applied 
sciences are interested in statements which are assumed to be useful, but without a high enough 
reliability so as to count them as truths.  In addition, applied sciences always ask fairly specific 
questions and usually include (at least implicitly) an interest in cost-benefit analysis.  One can 
see the difference between pure and applied science as similar to the distinction between theory 
and process – for example, one does not need to know why a car needs oil in order to learn that 
changing the oil frequently will result in longer engine life (the latter is called an instrumental 
hypothesis).  Mattessich states that “an instrumental hypothesis is acceptable because the 
assumption that it is ‘goal attaining’ is supported by stronger evidence than that of any 
alternative available” (Mattessich, 1980, p. 15). This is similar to, but not the same as, an 
epistemic pragmatism: “the pragmatic view that something is true because it is useful, must not 
be confused with the belief that truth in the long-run may prove useful, and that the relation 
between truth and usefulness requires further exploration” (ibid, p. 16). 
Sorber offers his own succinct definition of scientific instrumentalism: “the point of 
science is to provide accurate predictions, not to tell us what theories are true” (Sorber, 2002, p. 
113).  He outlines an approach to verifying models, based on the work of Akaike, which 
combines maximum data fitting with the principle of parsimony.   In order to create an 
hypothesis, factors can be combined in a number of ways, setting some coefficients to zero in 
order to remove them from the analysis entirely.  The NULL hypothesis is the well-known, 
simple hypothesis that that there is no relationship.  There are at least three different ways that 
such an hypothesis can be interpreted: “Bayesians assess which hypotheses are most probable, 
frequentists evaluate which hypotheses should be rejected, and likelihoodists say which 
hypothesis is best supported” (Sorber, 2002, p. 112).  Akaike's method allows one to estimate a 
model's predictive accuracy, using an iterative method which is structurally very similar to the 
notion of coherence described by the present author in a forthcoming paper.  Sober's article 
demonstrates the possibility of a computational model of instrumentalism, at least in the sense 
that it is used in the philosophy of science.   
 
Comparisons of positions 
It is possible to see the previous three notions of instrumentalism as intertwined and 
differentiated; a discussion of how these are similar and dissimilar should suffice for an 
explication of the issues involved. 
Perhaps a critical theorist would say that the the notions attributed to Dewey and the 
concept as described by  Mattessich and Sorber are aspects of the same mistaken notion of 
objective reality.  “When the individual confronts objective reality he is faced by a complex of 
ready-made and unalterable objects which allow him only the subjective responses of recognition 
or rejection. Only the class can relate to the whole of reality in a practical revolutionary way ... 
And the class, too, can only manage it when it can see through the reified objectivity of the given 
world to the process that is also its own fate” (Lukács, 1967).   In this view, Dewey's individual 
decision maker can only see the reality that has been created for him; in fact, focusing on the 
individual is inherently doomed:  “Thus for reified man a robust causal determinism is more 
accessible than those mediations that could lead him out of his reified existence. But to posit the 
individual man as the measure of all things is to lead thought into the labyrinths of mythology” 
(Lukács, 1967). In a similar manner, one might argue that the approaches of Mattessich and 
Sorber are simply perpetuating the myth of a static, fixed reality which can be codified. 
In proposing that these three forms of instrumentalism are different from one another, one 
could focus on what is the referent of the instrumentation.  The position of  Lukács and 
Habermas, one might argue, is oriented toward the social/political/economic aspect of human 
existence, while the position attributed to Dewey focuses on an individualistic view of life, and  
Mattessich and Sorber are discussing aspects of the universe which do not specifically require 
human beings-in-the-loop (i.e., what we generally refer to as objective phenomena).  Of course, a 
critical theorist might argue that the other two positions are mere fantasy, but this is an 
ideological / theoretical position and not necessarily the case.   
Blended views of instrumentalism in education 
Perhaps the most succinct statement of an anti-instrumentalist perspective that I have read 
is from Foley (1993): “Adult education, through its instrumentalist, professionalised and 
decontextualised practices and discourses, is implicated in processes of capitalist domination and 
capitalist reorganisation. Adult educators who wish to contribute to struggles against capitalist 
domination must stop seeing adult learning and education as purely technical, interpersonal and 
institutionalised activities. They must recognize that adult education and learning are also 
complex, and contested, social, cultural and historical processes.”   
Amartya Sen, winner of the Nobel Prize in economics, proposes a “human capability” 
model which illuminates “the concept that education involves both intrinsic and instrumental 
values” (Saito, 2003, p. 24).  According to Saito (2003), Sen's theory stands in contrast to the 
human capital model in that, although it includes human roles in economic production (as does 
human capital theory), it also incorporates human capabilities as they directly relate to the well-
being and freedom of people, and also to their indirect role in social change (ibid).  This 
approach comes close to incorporating all three types of instrumentalism described above. “In 
short, on the one hand, education is an important factor in broadening human capabilities, which 
include human capacities. On the other hand, human capabilities play a role in influencing both 
intrinsic and instrumental values. Therefore, it seems appropriate to say that education plays a 
role in influencing both intrinsic and instrumental values. What the concept of human 
capabilities has contributed to this discussion is to clarify the process of influencing intrinsic and 
instrumental values through education. Clarifying this process helps to show education as 
concerned with both intrinsic and instrumental value” (ibid). 
Blacker (2000) lays out aspects of the arguments for and against instrumentalism in 
education, claims it is a false dilemma, then seeks to repair this dichotomy by positing a non-
foundationalist contextualism. The author describes one non-instrumentalist viewpoint as “a 
conviction that there is something to education that is not reducible to its serviceability to 
allegedly higher aims” and the instrumentalist retort that “non-instrumental conceptions are 
usually held to be overly aloof, if not elitist and therefore complicit in perpetuating societal 
inequalities”.  He then lays out the various sides of the debate, concluding that neither position is 
tenable: any attempt at grounding a justification is necessarily thwarted, depending as it does on 
a foundationalistic account.  
The second part of Blacker's article describes a model wherein education exists in a 
dynamic tension with other social institutions and, as such, is both dependent on these social 
tensions and yet autonomous from them.  This is a systems-theoretic approach, viewing 
education not so much as a thing-in-itself, but instead as a dynamic balancing act: “liberal 
democratic educational institutions ought to be understood as strongly ensconced within a 
justificatory network of distinct and sometimes conflicting nodes of obligation” (Blacker, 2000, 
p. 230).  This leads to a pragmatic autonomy, since “if there are enough of these mutually 
canceling forces and they are positioned properly, there arises a kind of autonomy – relative 
autonomy – wherein it is possible to imagine a kind of self-standing freedom that is not 
obviously dependent upon any metaphysical buoy” (Blacker, 2000, p. 238).  One potential issue 
with this model is the role of temporality; it is not clear whether the dynamic tension between 
elements of the system is a static tension (as in a coherence network) or a dynamic settling-out 
(as in a  von Bertalanffy-type system). 
Similar to Sen and Saito, Blacker claims that some educational moments are valued in-
and-of-themselves, while others have merely instrumentalist value, what Blacker calls value 
from the 'inside' versus the 'outside.'  He continues: “There seem to be inescapably purposive 
practices that cannot truly be understood in isolation from the external goods they generate.  
Clear examples would include agriculture and medicine, where the generation of external goods 
is necessary to the meaning of the practice itself... Only trivially would one be farming if one's 
crops were perpetually so horrid as to be unusable by anyone.  In extreme cases, they might even 
become hopelessly deformed via a sort of spherical involution, where practitioners become 
overly immersed in purely internal imperatives that occlude the just-as-necessary externalities... 
(this) is commonly found among certain segments of the humanities faculties of US research 
universities, where devotion to increasingly inbred forms of scholarship proportionately inhibits 
the achievement of externalities long popularly associated with the humanities” (Blacker, 2000, 
pgs. 234-235). 
The notion of instrumentalism seems to come complete with a notion of goals; these 
goals might be ethical, they might not, they might be conscious or unconscious.  One way of 
viewing the situation is to say that we can separate the goals from the methods of achieving 
them; others would argue that this was the same “logic” that allowed Auschwitz to happen.  Is it 
possible to separate goals from methods?  One might point to the example Wernher von Braun, 
who at least declared that he was “apolitical.”  Whether this is a tenable position is arguable on 
two fronts: (1) is it ethical to separate these notions this way? and (2) is it possible to, or is this 
an illusion on the part of von Braun? 
 
Goals and purposes in Adult Education 
Some people (as discussed by Blacker) might propose that education is a good-in-itself, 
and therefore no further explanation is needed.  However, this position seems to beg several key 
questions: what is to be learned?  who (if anyone) will teach?  is it true that any learning, no 
matter the content, is good?  All that we need is one counter-example in which this is an 
unjustifiable position, and they are easy to come by.  If we are unwilling to accept education as 
its own justification, then what are we willing to accept? 
It seems to me that we must take a position as to our goals as adult educators. If we take 
the position of negation, we risk falling into a radical skepticism which obviates any attempt at 
achieving our goals.  Another possibility is that we might fall back to a world-denying mysticism 
and become totally inner-directed.  In contrast to this, I believe it is possible to improve the lives 
of real people, and some of this improvement can be attained through appropriate uses of 
educational techniques in the course of learning appropriate material.  The choice of what is 
appropriate is necessarily a judgment call on the part of the educator in concert with the adult 
student; however, just because this judgment has the risk of being faulty does not mean we 
should never take a  step forward.    
Thus, I believe that any workable theory of adult education must incorporate the 
complexity of interaction and structural supports between all of the “players” in the system: 
students, instructors, institutions, employers, governments, economies, etc.  It is almost a surety 
that some of the movements within such a complex will support the system itself; something that 
critical educators are often loath to do.   However, chaos theory tells us that the very complexity 
of the relationships means that small movements can cause large changes, if properly timed and 
executed.  Lao Tsu wrote that “In the universe great acts are made up of small deeds” and 
Lukacs writes that “decisive actions can involve an - apparently - trivial matter” (Lukacs, 1967). 
Frick (1995) discusses a plan to develop educational theory in a simulation environment.  
Drawing from the work of Maccia & Maccia, who propose 201 hypotheses concerning 
relationships among properties of educational systems, Frick proposes to build software 
simulations of the complex interrelations within an educational system, and to use these 
simulations to help educators and administrators to propose innovations within their systems. 
(See also King & Frick, 1999).  If even mildly successful, such a tool would allow educational 
theorists and policy-makers to test out the results of their theories in a way which is (a) deeper 
than can be done via an “armchair” analysis alone and (b) safer than testing theories on humans 
as a first draft.  Such an approach has been taken in the pharmaceutical industry for years; it can 
never replace actual implementation with humans, but it can at least help the researcher to focus 
on those ideas which have a higher potential for success.  Frick proposes that the reason this 
approach has not been developed in education thus far is that most people do not think in a 
systems manner; he contends that a  shift in thinking must occur before an approach such as his 
will gain general acceptance.  
It is important to note that Frick (and my) invocations of systems theory refer to  
rigorously developed models, not the “vague and superficial analogies” (von Bertalanffy, 1968, 
p. 35) which are often mistaken for a fully worked-out theories. Systems theory, system 
dynamics, and similar phrases are often found in the literature of education (in general); e.g.,  
Sterman (1994) offers an excellent, detailed introduction to the use of systems theory in 
education. However, a review of the literature shows a wide divergence in understanding of the 
subject. Systems theory was initially developed by biologist Ludwig von Bertalanffy as a 
rigorous method of describing the structure and mechanisms of biological systems. He was very 
concerned about “the danger that general system theory may end up in meaningless analogies” 
(von Bertalanffy, 1968, p. 35).  Many of the references to systems theory in the education 
literature are, unfortunately, of this type (Shaffer, 2004).  This does not mean, however, that all 
uses of systems theory in educational contexts are naïve or trivial. 
In summary, if we are to have goals as adult educators, and if we wish to fulfill our goals, 
it seems to me that we must try to develop workable theories.  Even the absence of a theory is, in 
effect, a theory.  Instrumentalism, in one way of looking at it, is simply the choices that we make 
with the expectation (or hope) of achieving our goals. 
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